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Abstract 
 In a generalized quality-ladder growth model, this paper firstly derives the optimal patent breadth 
and the socially optimal profit-sharing arrangement between patentholders. In this general-equilibrium 
setting, it identifies and derives a dynamic distortion of markup pricing on capital accumulation that has 
been neglected by previous studies on patent policy. Then, it quantitatively evaluates the effects of 
eliminating blocking patent and increasing patent breadth, and this exercise suggests a number of 
findings. Firstly, the market economy underinvests in R&D so long as a non-negligible fraction of long-
run TFP growth is driven by R&D. Secondly, increasing patent breadth may be an effective solution to 
R&D underinvestment. The resulting effect on long-run consumption can be substantial because the 
harmful distortionary effects are relatively insignificant. However, the damaging effect of blocking patent 
arising from suboptimal profit-sharing arrangements between patentholders can be quantitatively 
significant. Finally, it considers the effect on consumption during the transition dynamics.  
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“Although length of protection is the most obvious policy lever for governing the 
profitability of an intellectual property right, it is not the instrument that shows up in 
patent disputes. Patent disputes almost always revolve around either validity of the patent 
in the first place, or the subtle question of how different another product must be in order 
not to infringe. The latter notion is colloquially known as the ‘breadth’ of the property 
right.” – Scotchmer (2004, p. 103) 
 
1. Introduction 
Patent protection in the form of patent breadth has strengthened in the United States (US) since the 80’s.1 
The facts that effective patent lives are very short and only a small fraction of patents are maintained until 
the end of the statutory term suggest that perhaps the term of patent is less of an important policy tool 
than patent breadth.2 The first objective of this paper is to develop a tractable framework for a general-
equilibrium analysis on optimal patent breadth using a quality-ladder growth model. In an environment 
with sequential innovations, patent breadth takes the form of lagging breadth and leading breadth. 
Lagging breadth provides patent protection against imitation while leading breadth provides patent 
protection against subsequent innovations, which might infringe existing patents. Whether an increase in 
leading breadth would enhance or dampen the incentives for research and development (R&D) depends 
on the profit-sharing arrangement between patentholders, who may engage in a complicated bargaining 
process. This paper derives the socially optimal profit-sharing arrangement between patentholders that 
should be implemented by the patent authority through designing an appropriate set of institutional 
policies for patent disputes to influence the patentholders’ bargaining power. Upon enforcing this optimal 
profit-sharing arrangement, the optimal level of patent breadth can be determined by balancing the social 
marginal cost of distortions arising from patent protection and the social marginal benefit of R&D. 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g. Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002), and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a comprehensive discussion. Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2002) provide data on the increase in the average number of patent citations, which can be viewed as a 
rough proxy for the broadening of patent breadth.  
2
 See, e.g. O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) for a survey of empirical evidence on the short effective 
lifetime of patents and the small fraction of patents that are maintained until the end of the statutory term.  
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 The second objective of this paper is to analyze the distortionary effects of increasing patent 
breadth. The patent-design literature emphasizes the tradeoff of patent protection between the incentives 
for R&D and the static distortionary effect of monopolistic markup pricing. However, mostly based on a 
partial-equilibrium setting, this literature neglects an important dynamic distortion on capital 
accumulation. In particular, increasing patent breath potentially raises the market value of patents on one 
hand and worsens the incentives for capital accumulation on the other by increasing the wedge between 
the marginal product of capital and its rental price. This paper identifies and analytically derives this 
distortionary effect in a generalized version of the quality-ladder growth model originating from 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).  
 The third objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment on the effects of 
eliminating blocking patent and increasing patent breadth. Figure 1 shows that private spending on R&D 
in the US as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has been rising sharply since the beginning of the 
80’s. Then, after a few years, the number of patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office also 
began to increase rapidly as shown in Figure 2. The calibration exercise takes as a premise the hypothesis 
that the incentive for private investments in R&D increases in response to broadening patent protection 
and makes use of the general-equilibrium framework to quantitatively evaluate the effects of increasing 
patent breadth and R&D along with the blocking-patent, static and dynamic distortionary effects on 
consumption. This numerical exercise suggests a number of findings. Firstly, the market economy 
underinvests in R&D relative to the first-best optimum so long as a non-negligible fraction of long-run 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth is driven by R&D. The quality-ladder growth model involves 
multiple externalities in R&D investment: (a) a negative intratemporal congestion or duplication 
externality; (b) a positive or negative externality in intertemporal knowledge spillover; (c) the 
monopolists’ static surplus appropriability problem which is a positive externality; (d) the monopolists’ 
dynamic surplus appropriability problem in the form of creative destruction which is also a positive 
externality; and (e) the business-stealing effect which is a negative externality. Furthermore, in the case of 
socially suboptimal profit-sharing arrangements between patentholders, there is an additional effect of 
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blocking patent that reduces the incentives for R&D. Given the existence of positive and negative 
externalities, whether the market economy over- or under-invests in R&D depends mainly on the extents 
of intratemporal duplication and intertemporal spillover, which in turn are imputed from the balanced-
growth condition between long-run TFP growth and R&D. Therefore, the larger is the fraction of long-
run TFP growth driven by R&D, the more likely it is for the market economy to underinvest in R&D.  
Secondly, increasing patent breadth may be an effective solution to the potential problem of R&D 
underinvestment. The resulting positive effect on long-run consumption can be substantial because the 
harmful effects of dynamic and static distortions are relatively insignificant. However, the damaging 
effect of blocking patent arising from socially suboptimal profit-sharing arrangements between 
patentholders can be quantitatively significant. Thirdly, the dynamic distortionary effect on capital 
accumulation has a more severe impact on consumption than the static distortionary effect from markup 
pricing unless the fraction of competitive industries in the economy is very large. Finally, it considers the 
effect on consumption during the transition dynamics. In particular, the economy does not always 
experience a significant fall in consumption in response to the increase in patent protection. Over a wide 
range of parameters, upon the strengthening of patent protection, consumption gradually rises towards the 
new balanced growth path by reducing physical investment and temporarily running down the capital 
stock. This finding contrasts that of Kwan and Lai (2003), whose model does not feature capital 
accumulation and hence predicts consumption losses during the transition path.  
 This paper relates to a number of studies. It provides an explanation and a potential solution to the 
R&D underinvestment problem identified by Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000). Jones and Williams 
(1998) develop a method to calculate the social rate of return to R&D based on endogenous-growth 
theory and show that estimates from the empirical productivity literature represent lower bounds on the 
true social rate of return. Using this information, they find that the socially optimal amount of R&D 
investment is at least two to four times larger than the actual amount. Jones and Williams (2000) adopt a 
different approach by calibrating a variety-expanding growth model to the data and obtain a similar 
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conclusion that there is underinvestment in R&D over a wide range of parameters.3 The current paper 
follows this latter approach by calibrating a generalized quality-ladder growth model with patent breadth 
as a policy instrument to show that the R&D underinvestment problem arises from insufficient patent 
breadth, and increasing patent breadth may be an effective solution to this problem. Furthermore, the 
calibration exercise takes into consideration Comin’s (2004) critique that long-run TFP growth may not 
be solely driven by R&D. 
 In terms of qualitative analysis, it complements the patent-design literature,4 which is mostly 
based on a partial-equilibrium setting, in providing a general-equilibrium analysis on optimal patent 
breadth and in identifying an important dynamic distortion on capital accumulation. O’Donoghue and 
Zweimuller (2004) is the first study that merges the patent-design and endogenous growth literatures to 
analyze the effects of patentability requirement, lagging and leading breadth on economic growth in a 
simple quality-ladder growth model. However, their focus was neither in characterizing the optimal patent 
breadth nor in quantifying the effects of eliminating blocking patent and increasing patent breadth. In 
addition, the current paper generalizes their model in a number of dimensions. For example, the usual 
Cobb-Douglas aggregator for intermediate goods is generalized to a CES aggregator to derive the 
condition under which patent breadth becomes ineffective in stimulating R&D. Goh and Olivier (2002) 
analyze the welfare effects of patent breadth in a two-sector variety-expanding growth model, and 
Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection in developing 
countries as a result of the TRIPS agreement using a multi-country variety-expanding model. However, 
these studies do not analyze patent breadth in an environment with sequential innovations. Li (2001) 
analyzes the optimal policy mix of R&D subsidy and lagging breadth in a quality-ladder model with 
                                                 
3
 Stokey (1995) also calibrates an R&D-growth model to examine the range of parameters under which the market 
economy underinvests in R&D. 
4
 The seminal work on optimal patent length is Nordhaus (1969). Some recent studies on optimal patent design 
include Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), Green and Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue 
(1998), O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), Hunt (1999) and Scotchmer (2004). Judd (1985) provides the 
first dynamic general equilibrium analysis on optimal patent length.  
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endogenous step size, but he does not consider leading breadth. Furthermore, none of the abovementioned 
studies feature capital accumulation so that the dynamic distortion is absent. 
 Laitner (1982) identifies in an exogenous growth model with overlapping generations of 
households that the existence of an oligopolistic sector and its resulting pure profits as financial assets 
creates both the usual static distortion from markup pricing and an additional dynamic distortion on 
capital accumulation due to the crowding out of households’ portfolio space, and he finds that the latter is 
more significant than the former. The current paper extends this study to show that this dynamic 
distortion also plays an important role and through a different channel in an R&D-driven endogenous 
growth model in which both patents and physical capital are owned by households as financial assets. 
 In terms of quantitative analysis, this paper relates to Kwan and Lai (2003) and Chu (2007). 
Kwan and Lai (2003) numerically evaluate the effects of extending the effective lifetime of patent in the 
variety-expanding model originating from Romer (1990) and find substantial welfare gains despite the 
temporary consumption losses during the transition path in their model. Chu (2007) uses a generalized 
variety-expanding model and finds that whether or not an extension in the patent length is effective in 
stimulating R&D depends crucially on the patent-value depreciation rate. At the empirical range of 
patent-value depreciation rates estimated by previous studies, patent extension has only limited effects on 
R&D and thus social welfare. Therefore, Chu (2007) and the current paper together provide a comparison 
on the effectiveness of patent length and patent breadth in solving the R&D underinvestment problem. 
The crucial difference between these two policy instruments arises because patent length affects future 
monopolistic profits while patent breadth affects current monopolistic profits.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the generalized quality-ladder 
model and derives the analytical characterization of optimal patent breadth and the dynamic distortion on 
capital accumulation. Section 3 calibrates the model and numerically evaluates the effects of eliminating 
blocking patent and increasing patent breadth on consumption. The final section concludes with some 
important caveats. Appendix I contains the proofs.   
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2. Optimal Patent Breadth 
The patent-design literature has identified and analyzed four patent-policy tools: (a) the term of patent or 
simply patent length; (b) patentability requirement; (c) lagging breadth; and (d) leading breadth.5 In a 
standard quality-ladder growth model, lagging breadth (i.e. patent protection against imitation) is assumed 
to be complete while leading breadth (i.e. patent protection against subsequent innovations) is assumed to 
be zero. This section derives the second-best optimal level of lagging and leading breadth chosen by a 
benevolent government in a generalized quality-ladder growth model.  
The model is a generalized version of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992). To prevent the model from overestimating the social benefits of R&D and hence the extents of 
underinvestment in R&D, long-run TFP growth is assumed to be driven by both R&D investment and an 
exogenous process as in Comin (2004). To prevent the model from overstating the effectiveness of patent 
breadth in stimulating R&D, the usual Cobb-Douglas aggregator for the quality-enhancing intermediate 
goods is generalized to a CES aggregator as in Laitner and Stolyarov (2005). To maintain the analytical 
tractability of the aggregate conditions under the CES aggregator, all the intermediate-goods industries 
are assumed to be monopolistic in this section; consequently, the static distortion is absent. To introduce 
the static distortionary effect of markup pricing into the model, a special case of the Cobb-Douglas 
aggregator will be considered in addition to the CES aggregator when performing the numerical exercises 
in Section 3. Furthermore, computation of the transition dynamics is possible under the Cobb-Douglas 
aggregator.6 In order to perform a more realistic calibration, the model is further modified to include 
physical capital, which is a factor input for the production of intermediate goods and R&D, and the final 
goods can be used for consumption or investment in capital. Finally, the class of first-generation R&D-
driven endogenous growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g. O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) for an overview of these four patent-policy tools. For a more 
detailed discussion on patentability requirement and leading breadth, refer to O’Donoghue (1998) and O’Donoghue, 
Scotchmer and Thisse (1998). 
6
 Although the arrival rate of innovations varies along the transition path, a tractable form for the law of motion for 
aggregate technology can still be derived under the Cobb-Douglas aggregator but not under the CES aggregator. 
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(1992), exhibits scale effects and is inconsistent with the empirical evidence in Jones (1995a).7 In the 
present model, scale effects are eliminated by assuming increasing difficulty in R&D successes as in 
Segerstrom (1998), which becomes a semi-endogenous growth model.8  
 The various components of the model are presented in Sections 2.1–2.9, and the balanced-growth 
equilibrium is defined in Section 2.10. Section 2.11 derives the first-best social optimum, and Section 
2.12 characterizes the second-best optimal level of patent breadth. 
 
2.1. Representative Household 
The infinitely-lived representative household maximizes life-time utility that is a function of per-capita 
consumption tc  of the numeraire final goods and is assumed to have the iso-elastic form given by 
(1) dtceU ttn
σ
σ
ρ
−
=
−
∞
−−
∫ 1
1
0
)(
. 
1≥σ  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The household has )exp(
.0 tnLLt =  
members at time t. The population size at time 0 is normalized to one, and 0>n  is the exogenous 
population growth rate. ρ  is the subjective discount rate. To ensures that lifetime utility is bounded, 
(A1) n>ρ . 
The household maximizes (1) subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2)  ttttt cwnraa −+−= )(& . 
Each member of the household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period to earn 
a real wage income tw . ta  is the value of risk-free financial assets in the form of patents and physical 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g. Jones (1999) for an excellent theoretical analysis on scale effects. 
8
 In a semi-endogenous growth model, the balanced-growth rate is determined by the exogenous population growth 
rate. An increase in the share of R&D factor inputs raises the level of the balanced growth path while holding the 
balanced growth rate constant. Since increasing R&D has no long-run growth effect in this model, the estimated 
effects on consumption are likely to be more conservative than in other fully endogenous growth models.  
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capital owned by each household member, and tr  is the real rate of return on these assets. The familiar 
Euler equation derived from the intertemporal optimization is  
(3)  σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
Along the balanced-growth path, tc  increases at a constant rate cg . The steady-state real interest rate is  
(4)  σρ cgr += . 
 
2.2. Final Goods 
This sector is characterized by perfect competition, and the producers take both the output price and input 
prices as given. The production function for the final goods tY  is a CES aggregator of a continuum of 
differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods )( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j  given by  
(5) 
ε
ε
/11
0
)( 






= ∫ djjXY tt , 
where )1,0[
.
∈ε . The constant elasticity of substitution as well as the absolute value of demand elasticity 
is )1/(1 ε− . This formulation nests the usual Cobb-Douglas aggregator in quality-ladder models as a 
special case with 0=ε . The familiar aggregate price index is 1)(
/)1(1
0
)1/(
=







=
−
−
∫
εε
εε djjPP tt , and the 
demand curve for each variety of intermediate goods is  
(6) ttt YjPjX )1/(1)()( ε−−= . 
 
2.3. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of monopolistic industries producing the differentiated quality-enhancing 
intermediate goods )( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j , and each industry is dominated by a temporary industry leader, 
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who owns the latest R&D-driven technology for production. The production function in each industry j 
has constant returns to scale in labor and capital inputs and is given by  
(7) )()()( 1
,,
)( jLjKZzjX txtxtjmt t αα −= . 
)(
,
jK tx  and )(, jL tx  are respectively the capital and labor inputs for producing intermediate-goods j at 
time t. )exp(0 tgZZ Zt =  represents an exogenous process of productivity improvement that is common 
across all industries and is freely available to all producers. )( jmtz  is the industry leader’s level of R&D-
driven technology, which is increasing over time through R&D investment and successful innovations. 
1>z  is the exogenous step-size of a technological improvement arising from each innovation. )( jmt , 
which is an integer, is the number of innovations that has occurred in industry j as of time t. The marginal 
cost of production in industry j is  
(8) 
αα
αα
−






−






=
1
)( 1
1)( tt
t
jmt
wR
Zz
jMC
t
,  
where tR  is the rental price of capital. The optimal price is a constant markup µ  over the marginal cost 
of production given by  
(9) )()(
.
jMCjP tt µ= . 
The profit-maximizing markup for an unconstrained monopolist is ε/1 . With a Cobb-Douglas 
aggregator, 0=ε ; therefore, it is always the closest rival’s marginal cost that is the binding constraint. 
Then, in the standard case of complete lagging breadth and zero leading breadth (to be defined in 
Sections 2.5 and 2.6), the industry leader is able to charge a markup of z  over the marginal cost without 
losing its market share to the closest rival. With a CES aggregator, }/1,min{
.
εµ z≡ . If ε/1≥z , then 
increasing leading breadth would have no stimulating effects on R&D because the industry leader would 
always choose a markup of ε/1  regardless the level of leading breadth. To analyze the implications of 
increasing leading breadth, the following parameter condition is assumed for the theoretical analysis 
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(A2) ε/1<z .9 
Then, the amount of profit earned by the leader of industry j at time t is  
(10) )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt −=pi . 
 
2.4. Patent Breadth 
This subsection presents the Bertrand equilibrium price and profit in the presence of patent breadth, which 
is denoted by η , under the optimal profit-sharing arrangement. Then, in the following two subsections, η  
is decomposed into lagging breadth lagη  and leading breadth leadη  (i.e. leadlag ηηη += ) to demonstrate 
the underlying assumptions behind the following analytically tractable expressions  
(11) )()( jMCzjP tt η=  
(12) )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt −= ηpi  
for ),0( ∞∈η  and ]1,0[∈j . The expression for the equilibrium price is consistent with the seminal work 
of Gilbert and Shapiro’s (1990) interpretation of “breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price.” A 
broader patent breadth corresponds to a larger η , and vice versa. Therefore, an increase in patent breadth 
enhances the incentives for R&D by raising the amount of monopolistic profit captured by each 
innovation but worsens the distortionary effects of markup pricing. This discussion implicitly assumes 
that εη /1<z  because the markup is now given by }/1,min{
.
εµ ηz≡ . When εη /1=z , patent breadth 
has no more stimulating effects on R&D and no more distortionary effects from markup-pricing. 
 
2.5. Lagging Breath  
The first deviation from standard quality-ladder models is the introduction of incomplete lagging breadth. 
Assume zero leading breadth 0=leadη  as in standard models for now. To reiterate, each innovation is a 
                                                 
9
 According to Broda and Weinstein (2006), the elasticity of substitution )1/(1 ε−  for differentiated goods has a 
mean estimate of 4.7-5.2 and a median estimate of 2.1-2.5. Given an empirical markup of 1.10 (e.g. Laitner and 
Stolyarov (2004)), it seems reasonable to assume that the markup in the data is not determined by demand elasticity.  
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constant step-size z  of a technological improvement, and this production technology, once invented, 
becomes public knowledge to fulfill the disclosure requirement for obtaining a patent. In the case of 
complete lagging breadth, the patent for )( jmt  allows the new industry leader to produce with any 
technology level ],( )(1)( jmjm tt zz −∈ , but the profit-maximizing level is )( jmtz . The former industry leader, 
who holds the patent for 1)( −jmt , is now also technologically feasible to upgrade its production 
process. However, to do so, she would infringe the patent of the new industry leader, and any licensing 
agreement would drive the licensee’s profit to zero.  
 The parameter 1≤lagη  represents the degree of lagging breadth. In the special case of complete 
lagging breadth 1=lagη , any technology level beyond 1)( −jmtz  is protected by the patent for )( jmt . In 
the case of incomplete lagging breadth 1<lagη , only technology level beyond lagt
jm
z
η−)(
 is protected. The 
following diagram illustrates the concept of incomplete lagging breadth. 
 
In other words, although the invention is a quality improvement of z , the patent only protects part of this 
invention lagzη  against imitators. Therefore, with incomplete lagging breadth, the Bertrand equilibrium 
price becomes 
(13) )()( jMCzjP tt lagη=  
for )1,0(∈lagη  and ]1,0[∈j . The amount of profit is  
(14) )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt lag −= ηpi  
for )1,0(∈lagη  and ]1,0[∈j . Incomplete protection against imitators forces the industry leader to lower 
its markup. On one hand, incomplete lagging breadth reduces the distortionary effects of markup pricing; 
on the other hand, the reduced profit worsens the incentives for R&D.  
 
1)( −jmtz  )( jmtz  patent protection 
lagt jmz
η−)(
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2.6. Leading Breadth  
The second deviation from standard models is the introduction of nonzero leading breadth, which protects 
patentholders against subsequent innovators. The formulation of leading breadth originates from 
O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004). Assume complete lagging breadth 1=lagη  as in standard models 
for now. The degree of leading breadth is represented by ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη . Standard models assume zero 
leading breadth (i.e. 0=leadη ). For example, if 1=leadη , then the most recent innovation infringes the 
patent of the second-most recent innovator. If 2=leadη , then the most recent innovation infringes the 
patents of the second-most and the third-most recent innovators, etc. The following diagram illustrates the 
concept of nonzero leading breadth with an example of leading breadth equal two. 
 
Therefore, nonzero leading breadth facilitates the new industry leader and the previous innovators, whose 
patents are infringed, to consolidate market power through licensing agreements resulting in a higher 
markup.10 The Bertrand equilibrium price under nonzero leading breadth is  
(15) )()( 1 jMCzjP tt leadη+=  
for ,...}2,1{∈leadη  and ]1,0[∈j . Assumption 1 is sufficient to derive this equilibrium markup price.  
 
Assumption 1: An infringed patentholder cannot become the next industry leader while she is still 
covered by a licensing agreement in that industry.11 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g. Gallini (2002) and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), for a discussion on market-power consolidation 
through licensing agreements.  
11
 The sufficiency of this assumption in determining the markup price is most easily understood with an example. 
Suppose leading breadth is one and lagging breadth is complete, the lower bound on the profit-maximizing markup 
is the square of z , which is the limit price from the collusion of the most recent and the second-most recent 
innovators against the third-most recent innovator, whose patent is not infringed upon by the most recent invention. 
In this example, the limit-pricing markup would be even larger if the third-most recent innovator happens to be the 
new industry leader. Continuing this reasoning, the markup could grow without bound or until it equals ε/1 ; 
)( jmtz  2)( +jmtz  
patent protection for )( jmtz  
1)( +jmtz  
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Then, the amount of monopolistic profit generated in each period by the licensing agreement between the 
industry leader and the infringed patentholders is  
(16) )()()1()( 1 jXjMCzj ttt lead −= +ηpi  
for ,...}2,1{∈leadη  and ]1,0[∈j . 
 Determining the share of profit obtained by the industry leader requires solving the profit-sharing 
arrangement (i.e. the terms in the licensing agreement) between patentholders. A stationary outcome is 
assumed to simplify the analysis.  
 
Assumption 2: There is a set of stationary profit-sharing arrangements for each ,...}2,1{∈leadη  denoted 
by ]1,0[),...,,( 121 ∈= +leadleadleadleadlead
η
η
ηηη σσσσ , where leadi
ησ  is the share of profit received by the i-th most 
recent innovator when leading breadth is leadη , and 11 1 =∑ += lead leadi iη ησ .   
 
Although the shares of profits and licensing fees eventually received by the owner of an invention are 
constant overtime, the present value of profits is determined by the actual profit-sharing arrangement. The 
two extreme cases are: (a) complete frontloading )0,...,0,1(=leadησ ; and (b) complete backloading 
)1,...,0,0(=leadησ . Complete frontloading maximizes the stimulating effect of leading breadth on R&D 
by maximizing the present value of profits. The opposite effect of blocking patent arises when profits are 
backloaded, and complete backloading maximizes this damaging effect on the incentives for R&D.  
 Assumptions 1 and 2 originate from O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) to formalize the 
modeling of leading breadth, but they did not derive the equilibrium outcome that requires solving the 
bargaining game between patentholders. Instead, this paper characterizes the optimal patent breadth by 
deriving the optimal profit-sharing arrangement.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
therefore, Assumption 1 is made to rule out this possibility. The empirical plausibility of this assumption is appealed 
to the existence of antitrust policy.  
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Assumption 3: The patent authority is able to enforce the socially optimal profit-sharing arrangement in 
the licensing agreements between patentholders. 
 
Proposition 1a: For any given level of patent breadth, the complete frontloading profit-sharing 
arrangement is socially optimal if there is underinvestment in R&D in the decentralized equilibrium.  
 
Proposition 1b: In the special case of labor being the only factor input for R&D, the complete 
frontloading profit-sharing arrangement is socially optimal if and only if there is underinvestment in 
R&D in the decentralized equilibrium. 
 
Intuitively, the first-order distortionary effect of markup pricing is determined by η , independent of the 
profit-sharing arrangement between patentholders. Therefore, given a level of patent breadth, the society 
is better off by having a profit-sharing arrangement that creates the largest incentives for R&D if there is 
underinvestment in R&D in the market economy. However, the underinvestment in R&D is not a 
necessary condition when capital is also a factor input for R&D because stimulating the incentives for 
R&D in this case also increases the rate of investment in capital that partly offsets the dynamic 
distortionary effect of markup pricing on capital accumulation. 
 Proposition 1 establishes the condition for the social optimality of the complete frontloading 
profit-sharing arrangement, in which the infringed patentholders of previous inventions allow the new 
industry leader to capture the entire amount of profits from her invention until the next innovation occurs. 
Every successful innovator goes through the cycle of being an infringing industry leader initially and an 
infringed patentholder subsequently. Therefore, the distinction between the frontloading and backloading 
of profits matters only because the real interest rate is higher than the profit growth rate. A real-world 
 - 15 - 
example of this profit-sharing arrangement is a royalty-free cross-licensing agreement.12 From a policy 
perspective, the complete frontloading profit-sharing arrangement should be implemented by the patent 
authority through the following policies: (a) compulsory licensing with an upper limit on the amount of 
licensing fees charged to subsequent inventors of more advanced technology; and (b) making patent-
infringement cases in court favorable to subsequent inventors of more advanced technology. 
 Given Proposition 1, the equilibrium price and the amount of profit for an industry leader are 
respectively )()( jMCzjP tt η=  and )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt −= ηpi . In the case of complete lagging 
breadth and zero leading breadth, 1=η . In the case of incomplete lagging breadth and zero leading 
breadth, )1,0(∈η . In the case of complete lagging breadth and nonzero leading breadth, ,...}3,2{∈η . In 
the general case of incomplete lagging breadth and nonzero leading breadth, ),0( ∞∈η . For example, 
5.1=η  corresponds to lagging breadth of 0.5 and leading breadth of 1. 
 
2.7. Aggregation 
The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(17) αα
ε
ε −
=







= ∫
1
,,
/11
0
)( txtxtttt LKZAdjjXY , 
where 
εε
εε
/)1(1
0
)1/()( )(
−
−








≡ ∫ djzA jmt t  is the level of R&D-driven technology. ∫=
1
0
,,
)( djjKK txtx  and 
∫=
1
0
,,
)( djjLL txtx  are total labor and capital inputs for production. The market-clearing condition for the 
final goods is  
(18) ttt ICY += . 
                                                 
12
 Under a cross-licensing agreement, each company lists a large number of patents that it owns and the companies 
are allowed to use any of the patents listed in the agreement. If the companies’ portfolios are similar in size and 
quality, the agreement may involve no monetary compensation. See, e.g. Jaffe and Lerner (chapter 2, 2004).  
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ttt cLC =  is the aggregate consumption, and tI  is the investment in physical capital. The factor 
payments for the final goods are  
(19) ttxttxtt KRLwY pi++= ,, . 
∫=
1
0
)( djjtt pipi  is the total amount of monopolistic profits. Substituting (7) and (8) into (12) and then 
summing over all industries yields  
(20) tt Y




 −
=
µ
µ
pi
1
. 
Therefore, the growth rate of monopolistic profits equals the growth rate of output denoted by Yg . The 
amount of factor payments for labor and capital inputs are  
(21) ttxt YLw 




 −
=
µ
α1
,
, 
(22) ttxt YKR 





=
µ
α
,
. 
(22) shows that the markup drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and its rental price. 
As will be shown below, this wedge creates a distortion on the rate of investment in physical capital.  
 Finally, the value of GDP should include the amount of investment in R&D such that  
(23) trttrttt KRLwYGDP ,, ++= .13 
trL ,  and trK ,  are respectively the number of workers and the amount of capital for R&D.  
 
2.8. Capital Accumulation 
The market-clearing condition for physical capital is  
                                                 
13
 In the national income account, R&D investment is treated as an expenditure on intermediate goods. Therefore, 
the values of investment and GDP in the data are 
t
I  and 
t
Y  respectively. The Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
National Science Foundation’s R&D satellite account provides preliminary estimates on the effects of including 
R&D as an intangible asset in the national income accounts.  
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(24) trtxt KKK ,, += .  
tK  is the total amount of capital available in the economy at time t . The law of motion for capital is  
(25) δttt KIK −=&   
δ  is the rate of depreciation. Denote the balanced-growth rate of capital by Kg ; then, the endogenous 
steady-state investment rate in physical capital is  
(26) ttK YKgi /)( δ+=   
for all t. The no-arbitrage condition δ−= tt Rr  for the holding of capital and (22) imply that the steady-
state capital-output ratio is  
(27) ))(1( δµ
α
+−
=
rsY
K
Kt
t
. 
Ks  is the endogenous steady-state share of capital for R&D. Substituting (27) into (26) yields 
(28) 





+
+
−
= δ
δ
µ
α
r
g
s
i K
K )1(
.  
In the Romer model, (skilled) labor is the only factor input for R&D (i.e. 0=Ks ); therefore, the 
distortionary effect of markup pricing on the rate of investment is unambiguously negative (i.e. 
0/ <∂∂ µi ). In the current model, there is an opposing positive effect operating through Ks . Intuitively, 
an increase in patent breadth raises the private return on R&D and consequently, the share of capital 
employed in the R&D sector. Proposition 2 in Section 2.11 shows that the negative distortionary effect 
still dominates if the intermediate-goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector. 
 
2.9. R&D 
)( jVt  is the value of the patent owned by the leader in industry j at time t and is determined by the 
following no-arbitrage condition  
(29) )()()()( jVjVjjVr tttttt λpi −+= & . 
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The first terms in the right is the flow profit generated by the patent at time t. The second term is the 
capital gain due to the growth in profit. The third term is the expected value of capital loss due to creative 
destruction, and tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of the next innovation in the same industry. This no-
arbitrage condition can be re-expressed as  
(30) )(/)(
)()( jVjVr
jjV
tttt
t
t &
−+
= λ
pi
. 
The aggregate value of the patents owned by all the industry leaders at time t is  
(31) 
tttt
t
tt VVr
YdjjVV
/
1)(
1
0
&
−+





 −
== ∫ λµ
µ
. 
Since the amount of monopolistic profits varies across industries with the CES aggregator, it 
leads to strategic considerations in terms of targeting innovations to a particular industry. To avoid this 
problem, the following assumption is made. 
 
Assumption 4: Innovation successes of the R&D entrepreneurs are randomly assigned to the industries 
in the intermediate-goods sector. 
 
Therefore, the steady-state no-arbitrage value of achieving a new successful innovation at time t is the 
expected present value of the stream of monopolistic profits given by  
(32) 
Y
t
t gr
YV
−+





 −
= λµ
µ 1
.
14
 
The arrival rate of an innovation success for an R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈h  is a function of labor input 
)(
,
hL tr  and capital input )(, hK tr  given by 
(33) )()()( 1
,,
hLhKh trtrtt
ββϕλ −= .15 
                                                 
14
 Because λ  is pinned down by the population growth rate along the balanced growth path (to be shown below), 
the value of a patent is unambiguously increasing in η . This implication is consistent with the empirical finding in 
Lerner (1994) that patent breadth is positively correlated with the market value in his sample of biotechnology firms. 
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tϕ  is a productivity parameter that the entrepreneurs take as given. The amount of expected profit from 
R&D is  
(34) )()()()]([
,,,
hKRhLwhVhE trttrttttrt −−= λpi . 
The first-order conditions are  
(35) ttrtrtt whLhKV =− βϕβ ))(/)(()1( ,, ,  
(36) ttrtrtt RhLhKV =−1,, ))(/)(( βϕβ .  
 To eliminate scale effects and capture various externalities, the individual R&D productivity 
parameter tϕ  at time t  is assumed to be decreasing in the level of R&D-driven technology tA  such that  
(37) φ
γββϕϕ
−
−−
= 1
11
,,
)(
t
trtr
t A
LK
, 
where ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dhhKK trtr  and ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dhhLL trtr . ]1,0(∈γ  captures the intratemporal negative 
congestion or duplication externality or the so-called “stepping on toes” effects, and )1,(−∞∈φ  captures 
the externality of intertemporal knowledge spillovers.16 Given that the arrival of innovations follows a 
Poisson process, Laitner and Stolyarov (2005) appeal to the Law of Large Numbers to show that the 
aggregate technology can be re-expressed as ( )tzAt .. )(~exp ελ= , where εεε εε /)1)(1()(~ )1/( −−≡ −zz . 
Therefore, the law of motion for R&D-driven technology along the balanced-growth path, in which λ  is 
constant, is given by   
(38) )(~)()(~)(~
..
1
,,
1
,,
εϕεϕελ γββφββ zLKAzLKAzAA trtrttrtrtttt −− ===& . 
                                                                                                                                                             
15
 This specification nests the “knowledge-driven” specification in Romer (1990) as a special case with 0=β  and 
the “lab equipment” specification in River-Batiz and Romer (1991) as a special case with αβ = .  
16
 This specification captures how semi-endogenous growth models eliminate scale effects as in Jones (1995b). 
)1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing on shoulder” effect, in which the economy-wide R&D productivity ϕqA  
increases as the level of R&D-driven technology increases (see the law of motion for R&D-driven technology). On 
the other hand, )0,(−∞∈φ  corresponds to the “fishing out” effect, in which early technology is relatively easy to 
develop and ϕqA  decreases as the level of R&D-driven technology increases. 
 - 20 - 
Along the balanced-growth path, the growth rate of R&D-driven technology denoted by Ag  is related to 
the population growth rate such that 
(39) ngz
A
LK
A
Ag K
t
trtr
t
t
A 





−
−
+





−
===
−
−
φ
βγ
φ
βγ
εϕφ
γββ
1
)1(
1
)(~)(
.
.
.1
1
,,
&
. 
Then, the steady-state rate of creative destruction is )(~/ ελ zg A= .  
 
2.10. Balanced-Growth Equilibrium 
The analysis starts at 0=t  when the economy has reached its balanced-growth path corresponding to the 
patent policy }{η . The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞
=0}),(,,,{ tttttt VjPRrw  and a sequence of 
allocations ∞
=0,,,, },),(),(),(),(),(,,,,{ ttttrtrtxtxttttt LKhLhKjLjKjXYIca  that are consistent with the 
initial conditions },,,,{ 00000 ϕAZLK  and their subsequent laws of motions. Also, in each period,  
(a) the representative household chooses },{ tt ca  to maximize utility taking },{ tt rw  as given;  
(b) the competitive firms in final-goods sector choose )}({ jX t  to maximize profits according to the 
production function taking )}({ jPt  as given; 
(c) the industry leaders ]1,0[∈j  in the intermediate-goods sector choose )}(),(),({
,,
jLjKjP txtxt  
to maximize profits according to the Bertrand price competition and the production function 
taking },{ tt wR  as given;  
(d) the entrepreneurs ]1,0[∈h  in the R&D sector choose )}(),({
,,
hLhK trtr  to maximize profits 
according to the R&D production function taking },,,{ tttt wRVϕ  as given;  
(e) the market for the final-goods clears such that ttt ICY += ; 
(f) the full employment of capital such that trtxt KKK ,, += ; and 
(g) the full employment of labors such that trtxt LLL ,, += . 
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 Equating the first-order conditions (21) and (35) and imposing the balanced-growth condition  
(40) )(~
,
1
,
εϕ ββ zKLg trtrtA −=  
yield the steady-state R&D share of labor inputs given by 
(41) 





−+
−
−
−
=
− YL
L
grs
s
λ
λµ
α
β )1(
1
1
1
.  
Similarly, solving (22), (36) and (40) yields the steady-state R&D share of capital inputs given by  
(42) 





−+
−
=
− YK
K
grs
s
λ
λµ
α
β )1(
1
.  
The balanced-growth rates of various variables are given as follows. Given that the steady-state 
investment rate is constant, the steady-state growth rate of per capita consumption is 
(43) ngg Yc −= . 
From the aggregate production function (17), the steady-state growth rates of output and capital are  
(44) )1/()( α−++== ZAKY ggngg . 
Using (39) and (44), the steady-state growth rate of R&D-driven technology is determined by the 
exogenous population growth rate n  and productivity growth rate Zg  given by  
(45) 





−
+





−
−
−
=
−
ZA gng α
β
α
β
γ
φ
11
1
1
. 
Long-run TFP growth denoted by ZATFP ggg +≡  is empirically observed. For a given TFPg , a higher 
value of Zg  implies a lower value of Ag  as well as a lower calibrated value for )1/( φγ −  indicating 
smaller social benefits from R&D.  
 
2.11. First-Best Social Optimum 
To derive the socially optimal equilibrium rate of investment *i  and R&D shares of labor *Ls  and capital 
*
Ks , the social planner maximizes  
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(46) ∫
∞
−
−−
−
−
=
0
1
)(
1
)/)1(( dtLYieU tttn
σ
σ
ρ
 
subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of Ls  and Ks  given by 
(47) αααα −−−−= 11)1()1( ttLKttt LKssZAY ; 
(b) the law of motion for capital expressed in terms of i  given by 
(48) δttt KiYK −=& ;  
and (c) the law of motion for R&D-driven technology expressed in terms of Ls  and Ks  given by 
(49) )(~)()(
.
)1()1( εϕγββγγββγφ zLKssAA ttLKtt −−=& . 
After solving this maximization problem, the modified Golden-rule rate of investment is  
(50) δσρ
δ
φσρ
γβα
++
+



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
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*
. 
Proposition 2 provides the condition under which the markup-pricing distortion moves the market 
equilibrium rate of investment i  away from the social optimum *i . 
 
Proposition 2a: The decentralized equilibrium rate of investment is below the socially optimal investment 
rate if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor input for R&D.  
 
Proposition 2b: An increase in patent breadth leads to a reduction in the decentralized equilibrium rate 
of investment if the intermediate-goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector.   
 
 Similarly, the socially optimal R&D shares of labor *Ls  and capital 
*
Ks  are respectively  
(51) 
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(52) 
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(51) and (52) indicate the various sources of externalities and distortion: (a) the negative congestion 
externality ]1,0(∈γ ; (b) the positive or negative externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers 
)1,(−∞∈φ ; (c) the static surplus appropriability problem ]1,0(/)1( ∈− µµ , which is a positive 
externality; (d) the distortion of patent protection in driving a wedge of 1>µ  between the factor payment 
for production inputs and their marginal products; and (e) the positive externality of creative destruction 
together with the negative externality of the business-stealing effect given by the difference between 
))1(/( λσρλ +−+− cgn  and ))1(/( AcA ggng +−+− σρ . In addition, in the case of suboptimal 
profit-sharing arrangements between patentholders, both )1/( LL ss −  and )1/( KK ss −  are decreased by 
the backloading discount factor that is a non-decreasing function of leading breadth.17 Given the existence 
of positive and negative externalities, it requires a numerical calibration to the data that will be performed 
in Section 3 to determine whether the market economy over- or under-invests in R&D. 
 If the market economy underinvests in R&D as also suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) and 
(2000), the government can increase patent breadth to reduce the extent of market failures. However, as 
Propositions 2 demonstrates, an increase in η  mitigates the problem of underinvestment in R&D at the 
cost of worsening the dynamic distortion on capital accumulation. At the constrained social optimum, the 
government balances these two effects or until patent breadth loses its effectiveness when εη /1=z .  
 
2.12. Second-Best Optimal Patent Breadth 
Given the market equilibrium conditions for )(ηi , )(ηLs  and )(ηKs , the benevolent government 
chooses the second-best optimal level of patent breadth *η  by maximizing 
                                                 
17
 Refer to equation (55). 
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(53) ∫
∞
−
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−
=
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)( dtceU ttn
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ησρ
 
subject to the aggregate production function, the law of motion for capital, and the law of motion for 
R&D-driven technology. An increase in patent breadth reduces )(ηi  while increases )(ηLs  and )(ηKs . 
If an interior solution such that εη /1
*
≤z  exists, then the first-order condition that balances the opposing 
effects on social welfare is given by  
(*) 0)()()()()()(
*
*
*
*
*
*
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
η
ηηω
η
ηηω
η
ηηω LLKKI
ssi
.  
Each of the 
.
ω ’s represents a weight on the social planner’s optimal rule for patent breadth,18 and the 
value of each 
.
ω  is increasing in the difference between the socially optimal and the market-equilibrium 
levels of its corresponding variable. For example, the further away the market-equilibrium rate of 
investment is from its social optimum, the larger the weight the social planner should place on η∂∂ /i  to 
prevent patent breadth from increasing the wedge.  
 
Proposition 3: Suppose there is underinvestment in R&D in the decentralized equilibrium. The first-
order condition that characterizes the optimal patent breadth is given by (*) if the patent authority 
enforces the socially optimal profit-sharing arrangement between patentholders. 
 
3. Calibration 
Using the framework developed above, this section provides a quantitative assessment on the effects of 
eliminating blocking patent and increasing patent breadth. Given the recent policy changes in increasing 
patent breadth in the 80’s, the structural parameters are calibrated using long-run aggregate data of the 
US’s economy from 1953 to 1980. The first numerical exercise considers the effects of eliminating 
blocking patent on R&D and consumption. The second numerical exercise considers the effects of 
                                                 
18
 See Appendix I for the details. Appendix II derives the analogous expression when the static distortion also exists. 
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increasing patent breadth to the second-best optimum while holding the effect of blocking patent constant. 
The results for this exercise are firstly presented for the case in which all sectors are monopolistic and 
hence the static distortion is absent. Then, the results are presented for the case in which there exist both 
monopolistic and competitive sectors in order to introduce static distortion into the model and to compare 
the relative magnitude of the static and dynamic distortionary effects. Finally, the transition dynamics are 
computed to investigate the effect on consumption during the transitional periods. 
 
3.1. Externality Parameters 
The first step is to calibrate the key externality parameters γ  (intratemporal duplication) and φ  
(intertemporal spillover). For each value of Ag , Zg , n , α  and β , the balanced-growth condition (45) 
determines a unique value for )1/( φγ − . The annual average TFP growth rate TFPg  is 1.33%,19 and the 
labor-force growth rate n  is 1.94%.20 The capital-intensity parameter α  in the production sector is set to 
a conventional value of 0.3, and different plausible values for the R&D capital-intensity parameter 
}3,2,,0{ αααβ ∈  are considered. 0=β  corresponds to the knowledge-driven specification in Romer 
(1990), and αβ =  corresponds to the lab-equipment specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and 
Jones and Williams (2000). }3,2{ ααβ ∈  corresponds to the case in which the R&D sector is more 
capital intensive than the production sector. I will firstly consider the case in which long-run TFP growth 
is solely driven by R&D (i.e. ATFP gg =  and 0=Zg ). Given the above parameters, I firstly calculate the 
implied value for )1/( φγ − , which is sufficient to determine the new balanced-growth level of 
consumption. However, holding )1/( φγ −  constant, a larger γ  implies a faster convergence rate to the 
new balanced-growth path; therefore, it is important to consider different values of γ . The calibrated 
values of φ  that correspond to a range of values for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  are listed in Table 1.  
                                                 
19
 Multifactor productivity for the private non-farm business sector is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
20
 The data on the annual average size of the labor force is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
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β / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0 0.85 0.71 0.56 0.42 0.27 0.12 -0.02 -0.17 -0.31 -0.46
α 0.81 0.62 0.43 0.24 0.06 -0.13 -0.32 -0.51 -0.70 -0.89
2α 0.77 0.54 0.30 0.07 -0.16 -0.39 -0.62 -0.85 -1.09 -1.32
3α 0.73 0.45 0.18 -0.10 -0.37 -0.65 -0.92 -1.20 -1.47 -1.75
Table 1: Calibrated Values for ϕ
 
 
3.2. First-Best Level of R&D Spending 
The second step is to calculate the first-best level of R&D spending, which requires the discount rate, the 
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the empirical markup. The discount rate is set to 
a conventional value of 0.04, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (i.e. σ/1 ) is set to 0.25.21 
The implied real interest rate given by )1/( ασρ −+= TFPgr  is 11.6%, which is higher than the 
historical real rate of return in the US’s stock market, and this higher interest rate implies a lower level of 
first-best R&D spending. As a result, the model is less likely to overestimate the extent of R&D 
underinvestment. For the empirical markup µ , I make use of Laitner and Stolyarov’s (2004) estimate of 
1.10 (i.e. a 10% aggregate markup).22 Given these additional parameters, I firstly calculate the calibrated 
values for the following useful ratio ))1()1(/(
. AcA ggng φσργ −+−+−  that appears in (51) and (52) 
for a range of values for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  and }3,2,,0{ αααβ ∈  in Table 2.  
β / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14
α 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
2α 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
3α 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
Table 2: Calibrated Values for γ gA/(ρ-n+(σ-1)gc+(1-ϕ)gA)
 
                                                 
21
 It is well-known that there is a discrepancy between the estimated elasticity of intertemporal substitution from 
dynamic macro models (closed to 1) and econometric studies (closed to 0). Guvenen (2006) shows that this 
difference is due to the heterogeneity in households’ preferences and wealth inequality. In short, the average 
investor has a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution while the average consumer has a much lower elasticity. 
Since my interest is in the effects on consumption, I calibrate the value of σ  according to the average consumer.   
22
 Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate that the aggregate profit share in the US is about 3%. Assuming cost 
minimization, the return to scale = markup x (1 - the profit share). Basu and Fernald’s (1997) estimates also suggest 
that “a typical industry has roughly constant returns to scale.” (p. 250) I prefer the larger empirical markup from 
Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) for the following reason. A larger markup leads to more significant distortionary 
effects and hence is less likely to overestimate the net social benefits of increasing R&D and patent breadth.  
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(51) and (52) show that the extent of R&D underinvestment is determined by the relative magnitude 
between ))1()1(/(
. AcA ggng φσργ −+−+−  and ))1(/()1( λσρλµ +−+−− cgn . Although the 
calibrated values for φ  in Table 1 vary across different values of β , the calibrated values for 
))1()1(/(
. AcA ggng φσργ −+−+−  vary only slightly across β . Therefore, I will consider αβ =  
that yields convenient analytical expressions as the benchmark. The first-best level of R&D spending as a 
share of GDP for αβ =  is given in Table 3.  
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
R&D 1.6% 3.1% 4.5% 5.7% 6.9% 7.9% 8.9% 9.8% 10.7% 11.5%
Table 3: First-Best Optimal R&D Shares 
 
The average ratio of private spending on R&D to GDP in the US is 1.15% between 1953 and 1980;23 
therefore, the model predicts that there was a severe degree of underinvestment in R&D before the 
increase in patent breadth in the 80’s. This finding of underinvestment in R&D is consistent with Jones 
and Williams (2000).  
However, Comin (2004) argues that Jones and Williams’ (2000) finding is based on the 
assumption that long-run TFP growth is entirely driven by R&D, which is still an open empirical 
question. To consider this critique,  
(54) TFPA gg .ξ= , 
where ]1,0[∈ξ  captures the fraction of long-run TFP growth that is driven by R&D. The remaining 
fraction of long-run TFP growth is driven by the exogenous process tZ  such that TFPZ gg )1( ξ−= . 
Given this modified setting, I plot the first-best R&D shares for ]1,0[∈ξ  in Figure 3. 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
Figure 3 shows that there was underinvestment in R&D prior to 1980 over a wide range of parameters. To 
determine the empirically relevant range for the values of ξ  essentially requires answering a much bigger 
                                                 
23
 The data is obtained from the National Science Foundation and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. R&D is net of 
federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. The observations in the data series of R&D spending are 
missing for 1954 and 1955.  
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question, “what are the factors that drive long-run TFP growth in the data?” This is certainly a very 
important question but beyond the scope of the current paper. Therefore, I will leave it to the readers to 
decide on their preferred numbers in Figure 3 and continue presenting results for a range of parameters. 
 
3.3. Blocking Patent 
The share of R&D in the data, denoted by R&D/GDP, corresponds to µ/rs  in the model. Because 
βα = , KLr sss == . In the case of suboptimal profit-sharing arrangement, rs  is given by  
(55) )()1(
)1(
1 leadcr
r
gns
s ηνλσρ
λµ






+−+−
−
=
−
, 
where )( leadην  is the backloading discount factor, whose value depends on the profit-sharing 
arrangement between patentholders. In the case of complete frontloading, 1)( =leadην .  
 
Lemma 4: In the case of the complete backloading profit-sharing arrangement, the backloading discount 
factor is given by leadYlead gr ηλλην ))/(()( −+= . 
 
The steady-state value of ν  can be calibrated from the following condition  
(56) 





+−+−
−
−
= λσρ
λµ
µ
µ
ν
cgnGDPDR
GDPDR
)1(
)1(
)/&(1
)/&(
. 
The calibrated values of ν  for a range of values for ]20.0,04.0[=λ  are in Table 4, which suggests a 
severe problem of blocking patent in the economy.  
λ 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
ν 0.376 0.293 0.252 0.227 0.210 0.199 0.190 0.183 0.177
Table 4: Calibrated Values for ν
 
A number of studies has estimated the arrival rate of innovations λ  (i.e. the obsolescence probability for 
a patent). For example, Lanjouw (1998) structurally estimates a patent renewal model using patent 
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renewal data in a number of industries from Germany,24 and the estimated probability of obsolescence 
ranges from 7% for computer patents to 12% for engine patents. Also, a conventional value for the rate of 
depreciation in patent value is about 15% (e.g. Pakes (1986)). In the current model, the patent-value 
depreciation rate is given by Yg−λ , which implies that λ  should be at least 15%. On the other hand, 
Caballero and Jaffe (2002) estimate a mean rate of creative destruction of about 4%. The average 
empirical estimate for λ  of 10% from these studies will be taken as the benchmark. 
Upon eliminating blocking patent (i.e. setting 1=ν ), rs  and R&D/GDP would increase 
substantially to the values in Table 5.  
λ 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
sr 3.3% 4.2% 4.8% 5.3% 5.7% 6.0% 6.3% 6.5% 6.7%
R&D 3.0% 3.8% 4.4% 4.8% 5.2% 5.5% 5.7% 5.9% 6.1%
Table 5: R&D Shares without Blocking Patent
 
In the following, the effect of eliminating blocking patent is expressed in terms of the percentage change 
in the balanced-growth level of consumption per year. Along the balanced-growth path, per capita 
consumption increases at an exogenous growth rate cg . Therefore, after dropping the exogenous growth 
path and some constant terms and solving for the balanced-growth level of technology and capital-labor 
ratio, the expression for the balanced-growth level of consumption that depends on the capital investment 
rate )(µi  and the R&D share )(µrs  simplifies to  
(57) 







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−−−
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αγφα
φ
αγφα
γ
αγφα
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µµµµµ )1)(1(
)1(
)1)(1()1)(1(
)1(
0 ))(1()())(1()()( . rr ssiic .25 
Therefore, the percentage change in the long-run consumption can be decomposed into four terms.  
                                                 
24
 The studies in this empirical literature are mostly based on European data. In the US, patent maintenance fees 
were not initiated until 1982, and the fees are due 3.5 years ($900), 7.5 years ($2300) and 11.5 years ($3800) after a 
patent is granted, rather than annually as in some European countries. 
25
 Refer to Appendix II for the derivation of the corresponding expression for the general case with static distortion. 
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Figure 4 shows that eliminating blocking patent should have a substantial positive effect on long-run 
consumption unless ξ  is very small. Also, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the change in 
consumption mostly comes from )(ln)))1)(1/((( µαγφαγ rs∆−−− ; in other words, other general-
equilibrium effects only have secondary impacts on long-run consumption.  
[insert Figure 4 here] 
  
3.4. Optimal Patent Breadth 
The next numerical exercise computes the second-best optimal markup *µ . If the empirical markup is 
below *µ , then, increasing patent breadth in order to stimulate R&D would improve social welfare.27 
Otherwise, patent breadth should be reduced. In the followings, a range of values for ]9.0,0[
.
∈ε  will be 
considered, and each value of ε  corresponds to a unique value of z  according to λε /)(~ Agz = .  
ξ / ε 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.2 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02
0.4 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04
0.6 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.06
0.8 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.08
1.0 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.09
Table 6: The Calibrated Values for z
 
Given an empirical markup of 1.1, Table 6 indicates non-zero leading breadth for a wide range of 
parameters (i.e. when 1.1<z ), and this finding is consistent with the backloading discount factor being 
                                                 
26
 Note that the coefficients in (58) are solely determined by α  and )1/( φγ − . 
27
 Social welfare refers to the lifetime utility of the representative household. 
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less than 1. Using Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) empirical estimates,28 I will set 8.0=ε  but also 
consider 0=ε  that corresponds to the standard Cobb-Douglas specification.  
 Figures 5a and 5b present the second-best optimal markup given by }/1,min{ ** εµ ηz≡  that can 
be computed by numerically solving (*). The calculation assumes that patent breadth increases while the 
effect of blocking patent (i.e. the backloading discount factor ν ) remains constant.29  
[insert Figure 5a here] 
For 8.0=ε , the constraint }/1,min{ ** εµ ηz≡  becomes binding for certain parameters. Also, there is 
insufficient patent protection (i.e. the empirical markup is too small) for a wide range of parameters.  
[insert Figure 5b here] 
For 0=ε , the optimal markup is simply given by 
*ηz . As before, there is insufficient patent protection 
for a wide range of parameters. In addition, the optimal levels of markup are almost identical for 
}8.0,0{
.
=ε  unless the constraint }/1,min{ ** εµ ηz≡  becomes binding.  
 Finally, the effects of changing the empirical markup from 1.1 to the second-best optimum are 
expressed in terms of the percentage change in the balanced-growth level of consumption per year. Figure 
6a presents the percentage change in long-run consumption for 8.0=ε . 
[insert Figure 6a here] 
For the range of parameters that involves insufficient patent breadth, increasing patent breadth to the 
optimal level can lead to a substantial increase in long-run consumption. For the range of parameters that 
involves excessive patent breadth (i.e. low values of γ  and ξ ), reducing the markup to the optimal level 
leads to a fall in long-run consumption due to the fall in rs  but improves welfare.
30
 In the case of 0=ξ  
(i.e. when R&D is completely wasteful), the increase in long-run consumption is driven by the 
                                                 
28
 See footnote 9. 
29
 Refer to Appendix II for a similar derivation of introducing a constant ν  into the optimal rule of patent breadth. 
30
 Note that maximizing long-run consumption is not the same as maximizing social welfare.  
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reallocation of resources to the production sector. Figure 6b presents the percentage change in 
consumption for 0=ε  and shows very similar results.  
[insert Figure 6b here] 
 
3.5. Dynamic vs. Static Distortions 
As mentioned before, the assumption that all intermediate-goods industries are monopolistic eliminates 
the static distortion. As a result, the previous numerical exercise overestimates the effect of increasing 
patent breadth on consumption. The assumption is made in order to maintain the analytical tractability of 
the aggregate conditions under the CES aggregator. In this subsection, this assumption is relaxed under 
the special case of a Cobb-Douglas aggregator. The followings sketch out the key equations, and the 
details of the changes in the model are provided in Appendix II.  
 The production function for the final goods becomes  
(59) 






= ∫
1
0
)(lnexp djjXY tt . 
Among the continuum of the intermediate goods ]1,0[∈j , a fraction θ  of the industries is characterized 
by perfect competition. Without loss of generality, the industries are ordered such that )()( jMCjP tt ′=′  
for ],0[ θ∈′j . The aggregate price level is  
(60) tt MCP .µ= , 
where θηµ −≡ 1)(z  is the average markup in the economy, and ηz  is the markup in monopolistic 
industries. Because of the markup pricing in monopolistic industries and the marginal-cost pricing in 
competitive industries, the industries’ ratio of factor inputs is ηz . Using this information, the aggregate 
production function becomes 
(61) ααηϑ −= 1
,,
)( txtxttt LKZAY . 
For )1,0(∈θ , )1,0()( ∈ηϑ  represents the static distortionary effect of markup pricing and is defined as  
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z
. 
Markup pricing in the monopolistic industries distorts production towards the competitive industries and 
reduces the output of the final goods. Also, )(ηϑ  is initially decreasing in θ  and subsequently increasing 
with 1)( =ηϑ  for }1,0{
.
=θ . Therefore, at least over a range of parameters, the static distortionary 
effect is increasing in the fraction of competitive industries.  
 Given this setup, I will once again numerically evaluate the change in the balanced-growth level 
of consumption from changing the level of patent breadth to the constrained optimum. R&D/GDP in the 
data relates to rs  in the model according to  
(63) 

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

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DR
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. 
An additional parameter that is needed for this exercise is the fraction of competitive industries θ , and 
results are provided for }5.0,25.0{
.
∈θ . With the static distortionary effect and a constant backloading 
discount factor, the first-order condition that characterizes the optimal patent breadth is given by  
(**) 0)()()()()()()()( =
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
η
ηηω
η
ηηω
η
ηηω
η
ηϑηωθ LLKKI
ssi
.
31
  
Figure 7a provides the second-best optimal level of average markup *µ  for 25.0=θ .  
[insert Figure 7a here] 
Comparing with Figure 5b (i.e. without the static distortion), the optimal level of markup is now smaller 
than before because of the static distortionary effect. However, the qualitative results remain unchanged 
that there is insufficient patent breadth over a wide range of parameters. Figure 7b provides the second-
best optimal level of average markup *µ  for 5.0=θ . In the case, the optimal markups become even 
smaller because the static distortionary effect are more severe at a higher value of θ . In summary, there is 
still insufficient patent breadth over a wide range of parameters. 
                                                 
31
 See Appendix II for the derivation. 
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[insert Figure 7b here] 
Finally, the effects of changing the empirical markup from 1.1 to the second-best optimum are 
expressed in terms of the percentage change in the balanced-growth level of consumption per year. With 
static distortion, the expression for the balanced-growth level of consumption becomes  
(64) 
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Figure 8a and 8b provide the percentage change in long-run consumption for }5.0,25.0{
.
∈θ  assuming 
the backloading discount factor to be constant as before. 
[insert Figures 8a and 8b here] 
Two important results emerge. Firstly, the positive effect on consumption is substantial unless either ξ  or 
γ  is very small. Therefore, taking the static distortionary effect into consideration does not alter the 
previous finding that increasing patent breadth could mitigate the R&D underinvestment problem and 
increase consumption. Secondly, the magnitude of the increase in consumption becomes smaller as θ  
increases because the static distortionary effect of markup pricing becomes more severe. Tables 7 and 8 
provide the partial effects on consumption from the static distortion given by )(~ln)1( 1 ηϑα ∆− − , and the 
dynamic distortion given by 
.
))(1ln()(ln)1)(1(
)1( ηη
αγφα
γφα ii −∆+∆





−−−
+−
. The following tables show 
that as θ  increases, the static distortionary effect becomes more significant but is still smaller than the 
dynamic distortionary effect. Furthermore, both effects are relatively insignificant compared to the change 
in consumption.  
                                                 
32
 See Appendix II for the derivation. 
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ξ / γ 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 ξ / γ 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
0.0 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8%
0.2 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% 0.2 1.3% 0.6% 0.0% -0.4% -0.8%
0.4 0.1% -0.1% -0.4% -0.6% -0.9% 0.4 0.6% -0.8% -1.9% -2.8% -3.5%
0.5 0.0% -0.3% -0.6% -1.0% -1.3% 0.5 0.2% -1.7% -3.1% -4.2% -5.1%
0.6 0.0% -0.4% -0.9% -1.3% -1.7% 0.6 -0.3% -2.6% -4.3% -5.6% -6.7%
0.8 -0.2% -0.8% -1.4% -2.0% -2.6% 0.8 -1.5% -4.7% -7.1% -8.9% -10.4%
1.0 -0.3% -1.2% -2.0% -2.8% -3.5% 1.0 -3.0% -7.3% -10.4% -12.8% -14.7%
Table 7a: Static Distortion for θ = 0.25 Table 8a: Dynamic Distortion for θ = 0.25
 
ξ / γ 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 ξ / γ 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
0.0 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.0 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
0.2 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% -0.1% 0.2 1.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.1% -0.1%
0.4 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% -0.8% -1.2% 0.4 1.0% -0.1% -0.8% -1.3% -1.8%
0.5 0.3% -0.3% -0.8% -1.3% -1.7% 0.5 0.7% -0.6% -1.4% -2.1% -2.7%
0.6 0.2% -0.5% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% 0.6 0.4% -1.1% -2.2% -3.0% -3.6%
0.8 -0.1% -1.0% -1.9% -2.7% -3.4% 0.8 -0.2% -2.4% -3.8% -4.9% -5.7%
1.0 -0.3% -1.5% -2.7% -3.7% -4.6% 1.0 -1.1% -3.9% -5.7% -7.1% -8.1%
Table 7b: Static Distortion for θ = 0.5 Table 8b: Dynamic Distortion for θ = 0.5
 
 
3.6. Transition Dynamics 
The purpose of this subsection is to compute the entire growth path of per capita consumption after the 
broadening of patent breadth. Again, this exercise is performed for the special case of the Cobb-Douglas 
aggregator, and all industries are assumed to be monopolistic. The dynamics of the model is characterized 
by the following four differential equations. The capital stock is a predetermined variable and evolves 
according to  
(65) δtttt KCYK −−=& . 
The aggregate technology is also a predetermined variable and evolves according to  
(66) zAA ttt lnλ=& .33 
Consumption is a jump variable and evolves according to the Euler equation  
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(67) σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
The aggregate value of patents is a also a jump variable and evolves according to  
(68) ttttt YVrV 




 −
−+=
µ
µ
νλ 1)(& , 
where the backloading discount factor ν  is assumed to be constant and equal its steady-state value.34  
At the aggregate level, the generalized quality-ladder model is very similar to the model in Jones 
(1995b), whose dynamic properties have been investigated by a number of recent studies. For example, 
Arnold (2006) analytically derives the uniqueness and stability of the steady state with certain parameter 
restrictions. Steger (2005) and Trimborn, Koch and Steger (2006) numerically evaluate the transition 
dynamics of the model. In summary, to solve the model, I firstly transform },,,{ tttt AKVc  in the four 
differential equations into its stationary form,35 and then, compute the transition dynamics from the old 
steady state to the new one using the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al (2006).  
Figure 9a compares the transition path (in blue) of log consumption per capita with its original 
balanced-growth path (in red) and its new balanced-growth path (in green) for the following parameters: 
5.0=ξ  and 55.0=γ . In this case, the optimal markup is 1.25, and long run consumption increases by 
31%.  
[insert Figures 9a here] 
Upon the strengthening of patent protection, consumption per capita gradually rises towards the new 
balanced growth path. Although factor inputs shift towards the R&D sector and the output of final goods 
drops as a result, the possibility of investing less and running down the capital stock enables consumption 
smoothing. To compare with previous studies, such as Kwan and Lai (2003), Figure 9b presents the 
transition dynamics for 1=δ  (i.e. complete capital depreciation). In this case, the result is consistent with 
Kwan and Lai (2003) that consumption falls in response to the strengthening of patent protection. 
                                                 
34
 Although the variation in the arrival rate of innovations may cause the backloading discount factor to vary along 
the transition path, its value is very difficult to determine. Therefore, a simple approximation is made here.  
35
 Refer to Appendix III for the details. 
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[insert Figures 9b here] 
To ensure the robustness of this finding, a sensitivity analysis has been performed for different 
values of ξ  and γ . At a larger value of either ξ  and γ , consumption increases by even more on impact. 
A larger ξ  also implies a higher position of the new balanced-growth path. Holding ξ  constant, a larger 
γ  implies a faster rate of convergence. When both ξ  and γ  are smaller than 0.45, the household suffers 
small consumption losses during the initial phase of the transition path. However, when either ξ  or γ  is 
closed to one, the other parameter could be as small as 0.25 without causing short-run consumption 
losses. In summary, strengthening patent protection does not always lead to short-run consumption losses.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to accomplish three objectives. The first objective is to develop a tractable 
framework for a dynamic general-equilibrium analysis on optimal patent breadth. The second objective is 
to analyze the dynamic distortion on capital accumulation that has been neglected by previous studies on 
patent policy. The third objective is to provide a quantitative assessment on the effects of eliminating 
blocking patent and increasing patent breadth. The calibration exercise suggests a number of findings. 
Firstly, the market economy underinvests in R&D so long as a non-negligible fraction of long-run TFP 
growth is driven by R&D. Secondly, increasing patent breadth may be an effective solution to this 
potential problem of R&D underinvestment, and the resulting effect on consumption can be substantial. 
 However, the readers should interpret the numerical results with some important caveats in mind. 
The first obvious caveat is that although the quality-ladder model has been generalized as an attempt to 
capture more realistic features of the economy, it is still an oversimplification of the real world. In 
particular, the finding of patent policy having a substantial positive effect on consumption is based on the 
assumptions that a non-negligible fraction of long-run TFP growth is driven by R&D and the incentive 
for private investments in R&D increases in response to broadening patent protection. The validity of 
these assumptions remains as an empirical question. Therefore, the numerical results should be viewed as 
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illustrative at best. The second caveat is that the representative-agent setting ignores the distributional 
consequences of increasing patent protection, and the efficiency-equity tradeoff should be carefully 
considered by policymakers. The third caveat is that the model is based on a closed-economy setting. If 
the suboptimal level of patent protection arises from a multi-country Nash equilibrium, a unilateral 
deviation from its social best response function would render a country worse off despite the increase in 
R&D. In this case, the numerical results should be interpreted as the effects of increasing patent 
protection from the Nash equilibrium to a more cooperative symmetric equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium 
is globally suboptimal because of the detrimental effects of international free-riding on innovations.36  
                                                 
36
 See, e.g. Grossman and Lai (2004) for an elegant formulation of this insight.  
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Appendix I 
Proposition 1a: For any given level of patent breadth, the complete frontloading profit-sharing 
arrangement is socially optimal if there is underinvestment in R&D in the decentralized equilibrium.  
Proof: Any profit-sharing arrangement that involves the backloading of payoffs reduces the present value 
of the stream of profits generated by a patent. Denote )1,0(∈ν  to capture this backloading effect  
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An rise in ν  increases )(νi , )(νKs  and )(νLs  and moves them towards to the constrained social 
optimum if there is underinvestment in R&D. For a given η  and µ , determining the socially optimal 
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subject to the aggregate production function, the law of motion for capital, and the law of motion for 
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The inequality is strict at the corner solution 1* =ν . Note that each of the derivatives is strictly positive, 
and the 
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ω ’s are defined as  
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The outermost bracket in )(νωI  is strictly positive for ]1,0(∈ν  if there is underinvestment in R&D (see 
Proposition 2). Each of the outermost brackets in )(νωK  and )(νωL  is also strictly positive for ]1,0(∈ν  
if and only if there is underinvestment in R&D. Therefore, the underinvestment in R&D is a sufficient 
condition for 1=ν .■ 
 
Proposition 1b: In the special case of labor being the only factor input for R&D, the complete 
frontloading profit-sharing arrangement is socially optimal if and only if there is underinvestment in 
R&D in the decentralized equilibrium. 
Proof: In the special case of labor being the only factor input for R&D, 0=Ks  so that i  is no longer a 
function of v . Consequently, the first-order condition for the optimal *ν  simplifies to  
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The term in the bracket is strictly positive for ]1,0(∈ν  if and only if there is underinvestment in R&D.■ 
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Proposition 2a: The decentralized equilibrium rate of investment is below the socially optimal investment 
rate if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor input for R&D.  
Proof: The socially optimal investment rate *i  is  
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Proposition 2b: An increase in patent breadth leads to a reduction in the decentralized equilibrium rate 
of investment if the intermediate-goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector.   
Proof: Differentiating i  with respect to η  yields  
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Since n>ρ  by (A1) and 1≥σ , βα ≥  is a sufficient condition for 0/ <∂∂ ηi .■ 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose there is underinvestment in R&D in the decentralized equilibrium. The first-
order condition that characterizes the optimal patent breadth is given by (*) if the patent authority 
enforces the socially optimal profit-sharing arrangement between patentholders. 
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Proof: The second-best optimal level of η  can be found by maximizing 
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(a6) and (a7) simplify to the following conditions 
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The expressions for the three derivatives are respectively 
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Lemma 4: In the case of the complete backloading profit-sharing arrangement, the backloading discount 
factor is given by leadYlead gr ηλλην ))/(()( −+= . 
Proof: The expected present value of a successful innovation in the case of complete backloading is 
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where laglead ηηη += . },0{ ∞∈leadη  represents leading breadth, and ]1,0( .∈lagη  represents lagging 
breadth. s  is a random variable representing the time it takes for leadη  innovations to occur (i.e. when the 
most recent innovator starts receiving monopolistic profits). Given the Poisson arrival rate of λ , the 
expected value of s  is λη /][ leadsE = . However, we are interested in ][ )( sgr YeE −− , which is different 
from ][)( sEgr Ye −−  because of Jensen’s inequality. The density function )(sf  is needed in order to 
calculate the expected value. From the Poisson distribution of innovation arrivals, !/)( leads leadse ηλ ηλ−  is 
the probability that there are leadη  innovations within the time interval s . Therefore, the density function 
of s , which follows the Erlang distribution, is )!1/()( 1 −= −− leadsessf leadlead ηλ ληη . Then, the expected 
value of the complete-backloading discount factor is 
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Manipulating this expression yields 
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The term inside the bracket is the expected value of s  from a Gamma distribution with a shape parameter 
of 1−leadη  and a scale parameter of )/(1 λ+− Ygr . Therefore, ][ )( sgr YeE −−  simplifies to  
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Appendix II 
To introduce the static distortionary effect of markup-pricing into the model, there must be both 
monopolistic and competitive sectors. To maintain the analytical tractability of the aggregate equations, 
the CES aggregator is converted to the usual Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by  
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Among the continuum of intermediate goods ]1,0[∈j , a fraction θ  of industries is characterized by 
perfect competition because innovations in these industries are non-patentable. Without loss of generality, 
the industries are ordered such that industries ],0[ θ∈′j  are competitive. Therefore,  
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for ],0[ θ∈′j . The aggregate price level is  
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where θηµ −≡ 1)(z  is the average markup in the economy, and ηz  is the markup in the monopolistic 
industries. The first-order condition from the Cobb-Douglas aggregator implies that the ratio of factor 
inputs in a competitive industry j′  and a monopolistic industry j  is  
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Substituting )( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j  into (b1), the aggregate production becomes  
(b5) e tx
tx
tx
ttt LL
K
ZAY
,
,
,
α








= , 
where e txL ,  is defined as  
(b6) txtxtxe tx LdjjLdjjLL ,
1
0
,
1
0
,,
)()(lnexp =






≠






≡ ∫∫ . 
 - 50 - 
In particular, denote )(ηϑ  as the ratio of e txL ,  and txL , , which is given by  
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for )1,0(∈θ . )(ηϑ  represents the static distortionary effect of markup pricing, and it enters the 
aggregate production function as   
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and the amount of factor payment to capital in the intermediate-goods sector is  
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Using the no-arbitrage condition δ−= tt Rr  and the law of motion for capital, the steady-state rate of 
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The aggregate value of patents with a constant backloading discount factor ν  is  
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The steady-state R&D shares of labor and capital are respectively 
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The second-best optimal level of η  can be found by maximizing  
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subject to the aggregate production function given by  
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the law of motion for capital given by  
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Note that )(ηϑ , )(ηs , )(ηKs  and )(ηLs  are all functions of η . The first-order conditions are  
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(b20) and (b21) simplify to the following conditions 
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The expressions for the four derivatives are respectively 
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The balanced-growth path of per capita consumption (in log) can be written as  
(b34) tgcc ct += 0lnln . 
tgc  represents the balanced-growth path of consumption and is exogenous because of the semi-
endogenous growth formulation. The balanced-growth level of per capital consumption at time 0 is   
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where 0Z  is normalized to one. The capital-labor ratio 00 / LK  and the level of R&D-driven technology 
0A  at time 0 are respectively  
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After dropping the exogenous growth path and some constant terms, the expression for the balanced-
growth level of per capita consumption that depends on )(~ ηϑ , )(ηi , )(ηKs  and )(ηLs  is  
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Appendix III 
This appendix provides the details of transforming the variables in the differential equations (65) – (68) 
into their stationary forms for the purpose of computing the transition dynamics numerically. The Euler 
equation is given by  
(c1) σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
Define a stationary variable )1/(1)/(~ α−≡ tttt ZAcc , and its resulting law of motion is 
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The law of motion for capital accumulation is given by  
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The law of motion for the value of patents is given by  
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The law of motion for R&D-driven technology is given by  
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To close this system of differential equations, the endogenous variables ( tr , trs , , t.λ ) are also expressed 
in terms of the four newly defined stationary variables. The interest rate is  
(c9) δµα α −= − /1
. tt kr . 
From the first-order condition of the R&D sector, the share of factor inputs in R&D is  
(c10) )1/()1/(1
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From the law of motion of R&D-driven technology, the Poisson arrival rate of innovations is  
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Finally, the steady-state values of the variables are  
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Figure 1: Private Spending on R&D as a Share of GDP
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Data Sources: (a) Bureau of Economic Analysis: National Income and Product Accounts Tables; and (b) National 
Science Foundation: Division of Science Resources Statistics.  
Footnote: R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. 
Figure 2: Number of Patents Granted
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Data Source: Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002): The NBER Patent Citation Data File. 
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Figure 3: First-Best Optimal R&D Shares for Different Values of ξ and γ
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
γ
ξ = 1
ξ = 0.8
ξ = 0.6
ξ = 0.4
ξ = 0.2
ξ = 0
US's R&D
 
Figure 4: Percentage Change in Long-Run Consumption from Eliminating Blocking Patent
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Figure 5a: Optimal Markup for ε = 0.8
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Figure 5b: Optimal Markup for ε = 0
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Figure 6a: Percentage Change in Long-Run Consumption for ε = 0.8
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Figure 6b: Percentage Change in Long-Run Consumption for ε = 0
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Figure 7a: Optimal Markup for θ = 0.25
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Figure 7b: Optimal Markup for θ = 0.5
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Figure 8a: Percentage Change in Long-Run Consumption for θ = 0.25
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Figure 8b: Percentage Change in Long-Run Conumption for θ = 0.5
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Figure 9a: Transition Dynamics of Log Consumption with δ = 0.08 
 
Figure 9b: Transition Dynamics of Log Consumption with δ = 1 
 
